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Selective Ban of Street Signs 
Metro Lights, LLC v City of Los Angeles (9th Cir 2009)  
55 F3d 898 
City ban of off-site commercial signs, excepting those installed under exclusive contract with city for 
sale and display of such signs at city-owned transit stops, does not violate First Amendment. 
In December 2001, the City of Los Angeles entered into a long-term contract with a vendor for 
the installation and maintenance of certain public facilities at transit sites in exchange for the 
exclusive right to sell and display advertising on those facilities. In addition, the vendor agreed to 
make annual payments to the city according to an agreed formula. In April 2002, the city adopted 
a sign ordinance that prohibited off-site commercial signs. The sign ordinance is part of the city’s 
Building Code, which excepts the public way, including transit stops, from its provisions. Metro 
Lights owns and operates outdoor, off-site signs in Los Angeles. After receiving several citations 
for violating the sign ordinance by installing new off-site signs, Metro Lights sued the city for 
relief, alleging, among other things, violation of the First Amendment. The United States District 
Court granted Metro Lights partial summary judgment o  its First Amendment claim, ruling that 
the city could not preclude Metro Lights from installing off-site signs while at the same time 
permitting its own contractor to install off-site signs in the public way throughout the city. The 
Ninth Circuit reversed. 
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis began by noting that commercial speech is accorded less 
protection than other constitutionally guaranteed speech. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v 
Public Serv. Comm’n of New York (1980) 447 US 557, 564, 65 L Ed 2d 341, 349, 100 S Ct 2343. 
Central Hudson announced a four-part test to determine the constitutionality of a restriction on 
commercial speech, which the Ninth Circuit applied to the city’s sign ordinance:  
1. If the communication is neither misleading nor relat d to unlawful conduct, the restriction 
merits scrutiny under the First Amendment.  
2. The government must have a substantial interest to be served by the restriction.  
3. The restriction must directly advance the government’s i terest. 
4. The restriction must not be more extensive than necessary.  
The parties agreed that the advertising merited First Amendment protection and that the 
government had a substantial interest to advance. Under Metromedia, Inc. v City of San Diego 
(1981) 453 US 490, 69 L Ed 2d 800, 101 S Ct 2882, which considered a similar ordinance 
banning off-site signs but providing several exemptions, including for bus stops, the restriction 
satisfies the third element (direct advancement of the governmental interest). As to the fourth 
element, the city’s vendor contract did not invalidte the ordinance. Although the city may not 
prohibit one advertiser and permit another simply because the latter paid a tax, the city may 
prohibit advertisers in general but permit them to bid for the right to advertise on city-owned 
property. In sum, applying the Central Hudson assessment, Metromedia compelled the 
conclusion that the sign ordinance, even in light of the city’s vendor agreement, was not 
unconstitutional. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE:  The court of appeal’s decision was much more difficult to follow than the 
district court’s (which simply held that “the city cannot, on the one hand, preclude plaintiff from 
displaying messages on its off-site signs as a supposed legitimate exercise of its police powers while, 
on the other hand, authorizing its Street Furniture contractor to erect off-site signs in or near the public 
rights of way throughout the City of Los Angeles”). The issue was made difficult because Supreme 
Court decisions do permit cities to discriminate between on-site and off-site advertising signs, even 
though both of them cause visual clutter. Thus, the fact that signs away from transit shelters are 
prohibited while those attached to the shelters are allowed does not automatically make this ordinance 
“underinclusive” or demonstrate a failure to directly advance a substantial state interest. The Ninth 
Circuit contended that a “ban on some off-site signs still advances traffic safety and esthetics more 
than a ban on none.” Because a city may “value one kind of commercial speech—on-site 
advertising—more than another kind of commercial speech—off-site advertising,” Los Angeles could 
prefer “controlled off-site advertising on public transit facilities” over “uncontrolled off-site advertising 
spread willy-nilly about the streets.” 
On its own, that distinction is respectable. But there was another fact in the opinion that intrigued 
me. The transit shelters where the signs were permitted had all been donated to the city by the 
company that collected the revenues for the signs hanging there. Indeed, the court noted, “the city has 
been compensated handsomely for this classically legislative decision, not only in money but in the 
installation of presumably more attractive public transit facilities and in a veto over the design of 
advertisements that appear at these facilities.” Does that feature bear on the First Amendment issue? 
In Fifth Amendment takings cases, the fact that the government itself is the prime beneficiary of 
restrictions it imposes on a property owner makes the regulation more suspect. For instance, in Fred 
F. French Investing Co. v City of New York (1976) 385 NYS2d 5, 350 NE2d 381, two small parcels 
across the street from the United Nations building had been rezoned as a “special park district” so as 
to permit only “passive recreational uses” (after the developer had announced plans to construct a 50-
story tower over them). The New York Court of Appeals held that the rezoning constituted a taking of 
property because the government was acting in its “enterprise capacity” rather than in its “arbitral 
capacity”—i.e., acquiring private resources for itself to perform public functions rather than simply 
intervening to resolve private conflicts between its citizens. 
The Ninth Circuit decision in Metro Lights makes it seem that the distinction between enterprise 
and arbitral activity does not also apply to First Amendment issues. According to the briefs, the 
plaintiff’s expert testified that signs on transit shelters were more distracting and more likely to cause 
accidents than signs elsewhere, but that got nowhere. But when local economic considerations may 
taint or outweigh esthetic ones, does First Amendment analysis remain unaltered? (The enactment of 
the off-site sign ordinance just four months after the city’s transit shelter contract with plaintiff’s 
competitor does add some plausibility to an inference of connectedness.) 
What else might a city do by way of speech restriction that carries with it the side benefit of revenue 
enhancement? Can it prohibit signs on taxicabs while allowing their continued display on municipal 
buses? Can it also make a profit by how it regulates on-site signs? Are there other ways to raise 
revenue by rationing public speech to those who can pay the most for it? 
The question of what kind of profit the government makes does not seem to be currently included 
as one of the relevant factors in determining the validity of commercial speech regulation. But perhaps 
it should be.—Roger Bernhardt 
 
